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CAN CHILD CUSTODY LAW MOVE BEYOND 
THE POLITICS OF GENDER?
Susan B. Boyd*
In 1989, Carol Smart and Selma Sevenhuijsen published Child Custody and the 
Politics o f  Gender,' an important collection o f feminist essays that revealed the 
complex ways in which unequal gender relations infused the law o f child custody 
and access. In the same year, the Canadian Journal o f  Women and the Law 
published a special issue on “Women and Custody.”2 Articles in both collections 
pointed to the undervaluing in child custody law of women’s care-giving roles in 
families and society as opposed to the overvaluing of men’s (still limited) caring 
roles. The collections also examined the rise o f the fathers’ rights movement, and 
the role that images o f fatherhood played in the politics o f parenting generally. They 
showed how children form part o f a nexus of power within family relations, and that 
fathers’ relationships with children can entail a power relationship with the mother 
o f the children.3
In this comment, I examine to what extent the politics o f gender in child custody 
law have changed in the decade since these two important publications. As we begin 
the twenty-first century, with many issues related to custody and access as yet 
unresolved in Canada, can we leave behind a focus on the politics o f gender? Can 
recent law reform initiatives in the field o f child custody and access succeed in re­
focusing attention on children’s interests, as opposed to the interests of mothers and 
fathers? We are fortunate in Canada to be able to draw on studies o f similar reform 
initiatives that were attempted in the late twentieth centuiy in jurisdictions such as
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England, Australia, and Washington State.4 These studies, to my mind, reveal that 
an understanding o f the shifting, complex nature o f gender relations and gender 
politics remains crucial to an understanding o f the dynamics o f child custody and 
access la\fr.
With the ongoing review o f child custody and access law in Canada at the end 
o f the 1990s, we still hear a great deal about gender bias in the laws relating to 
children. But despite the active engagement in the law reform process by women’s 
groups, the focus has been on gender bias against fathers rather than mothers, and 
the ways in which children’s interests are damaged as a result.5 It appears that the 
fathers’ rights movement quite successfully set the agenda for the 1998 review o f 
custody and access by the Special Joint (Senate and House o f Commons) Committee 
on Child Custody and Access (hereafter “the Committee”)6 by asserting that gender 
bias in this field operates against fathers, not mothers. These groups also aligned the 
rights o f fathers with the needs and best interests o f children. They asserted that 
there was a crucial need for the “children o f  divorce” to have contact with their 
fathers in order to ensure the psychological well-being o f the children.
These assertions linking fathers’ rights with children’s interests have been 
accorded wide currency and have been legitimated during the law reform process, 
despite the conflicting evidence in social science studies on “children o f divorce.” 
Taken as a whole, these studies show that continuing contact with each parent is only
4 C. Smart & B. Neale, Family Fragments (Malden: Polity Press, 1999) [hereinafter Family Fragments]; 
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one factor associated with positive outcomes for children.7 If  anything, the studies 
show there is no evidence that frequency o f visiting or amount o f time spent with 
non-custodial parents is significantly related to a good outcome in children.8 
However, the discourse in child custody debates is often not based on evidence in 
studies but rather on rhetoric. In the final report o f the Committee, For the Sake o f  
the Children, little effort was made to review the contradictory results o f the studies 
or to make use o f the helpful reviews o f the social science literature that already 
existed.9
Moreover, the short section on “Gender Bias in the Courts” in the Committee’s 
Report focussed entirely on fathers’ experiences of gender bias, ignoring the notion 
that gender bias against mothers might exist.10 No reference was made to mothers’ 
experiences o f gender bias, the undervaluing o f their primary care-giving, or the 
overlooking o f domestic abuse by the courts, though these points had all been made 
in oral and written submissions to the Committee.11 Nor was Canadian academic 
literature on the subject cited.12 Women’s groups had attempted during the 
Committee’s hearings to link the need to take account of gender-based phenomena 
such as care-giving and the systemic nature of abuse with the best interests o f 
children. * However, the section on Gender Bias promoted a view o f custodial 
mothers as manipulative and selfish, ignoring the studies that show that most
7 See review of the social science literature in M. Bailey & M. Giroux, Relocation o f Custodial Parents: 
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custodial mothers would like to see more participation by fathers in their children’s 
lives, not less.13 The Report o f the Committee also urged imposition o f a norm o f 
shared parenting in legislation that would empower fathers and apparently solve 
these problems. A key recommendation o f  the Committee was that “shared 
parenting?’ replace the concepts o f “custody” and “access” in the Divorce Act and 
other family laws.
The omission o f arguments by women’s groups in the Gender Bias section o f 
the report must be placed in the context o f the history o f the Special Joint Committee 
and the Joint Committee’s mandate. The Special Joint Committee was established 
in response to the complaints and concerns o f fathers’ rights groups about the 1997 
reforms to child support (including the child support guidelines and enhanced 
enforcement measures). As the introduction to the Report says, these reforms 
contained in Bill C-41 passed through the Senate Committee only when the 
Honourable Allan Rock, Minister o f Justice at the time, agreed to strike a 
parliamentary committee consisting o f Senators and Members o f the House o f 
Commons to examine custody and access-related concerns. The mandate o f the 
Committee was:
to examine and analyze issues relating to custody and access arrangements after 
separation and divorce, and in particular, to assess the need for a more child-centred 
approach to family law policies and practices that would emphasize joint parental 
responsibilities and child focused parenting arrangements based on children’s needs 
and best interests.14
The wording o f the mandate differed somewhat from the original wording proposed, 
and strengthened the emphasis on joint parenting arrangements, a key plank o f the 
fathers’ rights movement. This shift in focus resulted from an amendment moved 
by Senator Anne Cools on October 28, 1997 and adopted by the Senate.15 Senator 
Cools had been particularly insistent that the stories told by non-custodial fathers be 
taken into account. The original mandate o f the Committee contained in a motion 
o f Senator Pearson, seconded by Senator Carstairs, read as follows:
13 C.J. Richardson, Court-based Divorce Mediation in Four Canadian Cities: An Overview o f Research 
Results, A Report for the Department of Justice Canada (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1988) at 36; D. 
Perry et al., Access to Children Following Parental Relationship Breakdown in Alberta (Calgary: 
Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family, 1992) at 37.
14For the Sake o f  the Children, supra note 6 at 1.
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to examine and analyze issues relating to parenting arrangements after separation 
and divorce, and in particular, to assess the need for a more child-centred approach 
to family law policies and practices that would emphasize parental responsibilities 
rather than parental rights and child-focused parenting arrangements based on 
children’s needs and best interests.16
This emphasis on parental responsibility may well have allowed a focus on women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for childcare in Canadian society, and the relationship 
between that care-giving responsibility and children’s interests. But from the start, 
the Committee was oriented by its mandate towards a preference for joint parenting 
arrangements and the link between joint parenting and the best interests o f children 
was already assumed. The original mandate would not have made this assumption, 
but rather left more open a determination o f what parenting arrangements might be 
more child-centred.
In emphasizing joint parenting as a goal from the outset, the Committee 
embraced a central tenet o f the fathers’ rights movement. As the work o f 1980s 
feminists revealed, fathers’ rightists have lobbied hard for a presumption in favour 
o f joint custody, even though few fathers seek actual care o f and responsibility for 
children as distinct from legal custody rights in relation to decision-making power. 
Anne-Marie Delorey suggested that “fathers who favour joint legal custody are 
actually seeking more rights and control without a corresponding increase in 
responsibility for their children.” 17 The compromise that Canadian legislators 
adopted at that period in 1980s reform to divorce law was to make joint custody 
orders a clearer option, but not a presumption, under the Divorce Act (section 16(4)) 
and to introduce a section emphasizing maximum contact between children and non­
custodial parents (the so-called “friendly parent rule” o f section 16(10)).18 This 
section directed courts to take into consideration the willingness o f the person 
seeking custody to facilitate such contact. These changes tended to make mothers 
who sought sole custody or restrictions on custody appear to be selfish and somehow 
“at fault.”19
16 Ibid. at ix.
17 A.M. Delorey, “Joint Legal Custody: A Reversion to Patriarchal Power” (1989) 3:1 C.J.W.L. 33 at 
38.
18 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.) c.3.
19 Delorey, supra note 17 at 38.
In contrast, fathers’ rightists have been able to position themselves as a 
disadvantaged group in the family-law system, often by drawing on conceptual 
frameworks related to equality law and essentialism that were developed originally 
by feminists. They have then been able to position themselves as advocates on 
behalf o f children. Vancouver lawyer Carey Linde, o f “Divorce for Men” suggested 
in his submission to the Special Joint Committee that the problem is with the 
“judicially assumed presumptions” -  that is, the maternal presumption or tender 
years doctrine -  that he suggests govern the day-to-day determinations of the best 
interest o f the child test in the lower courts. These “presumptions,” he says, “spring 
from and are maintained out o f gender biases still ingrained in the system.”20 Linde 
illustrates his point as follows:
Suppose fifty couples -  fifty dads and fifty moms -  all come into the courts on the 
same day. In each case both spouses are seeking an order for exclusive possession 
of the matrimonial home -  seeking to have the other parent kicked out of the house, 
leaving the kids at home. All the dads and all the moms are equally good parents.
All one hundred individuals have exactly the same income and stable jobs. The kids 
are all around 10 to 12 years old. If gender equity prevailed in our courts as some 
would lead us to believe, at the end of the court day 25 men should be ordered out 
and 25 women ordered out. Half the parents left in the home with the kids should 
be dads and half moms. If you believe that, you believe in the tooth fairy.21
Linde invokes a rather simplistic model o f formal equality that focuses on a count 
o f “successful” custody applications, rather than on the care-giving patterns in the 
child’s life, which are not yet equally distributed as between women and men. Later 
in his brief, he applauds the “equity feminists” who support fathers and he criticizes 
the “gender feminists” or “adolescent feminists” who “want to borrow the car [the 
child presumably], but are not willing to pay for the gas.”22 As is typical in fathers’ 
rights discourse, Linde implies that it is problematic for non-residential parents to 
contribute to their child’s financial support. Fathers’ rightists typically argue that 
mothers have been privileged with custody o f children while fathers are unjustly 
required to pay outrageous child support.23
20 “Unethical Lawyers Abuse Children,” Carey Linde’s brief is available on Linde’s website, online: 
<http://www.divorce-for-men.com/JOINTCOM.doc> (date accessed: 02 February 2000).
21 Ibid.
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(1993) 14:4 J. o f Family Issues 592 at 606-10. See also M. Kaye & J. Tolmie, “Discoursing Dads: The 
Rhetorical Devices of Fathers’ Rights Groups” (1998) 22:1 Mel. U. L. Rev. 162 at 185-6.
Another example o f the ways in which fathers’ rights arguments are being 
constructed is provided by a 1998 article by Paul Millar and Sheldon Goldenberg: 
“Explaining Child Custody Determinations in Canada.”24 Despite the notoriously 
partial nature o f Canadian statistics on custody and access, and the fact that they 
include “consent” awards where parents have agreed to a custody arrangement, these 
figures are often used by scholars and fathers’ rights groups to bolster an argument 
that the legal system is biased in favour o f mothers and against fathers. Millar and 
Goldenberg first attempt to establish the “scientific” credibility o f their study -  done 
from “an empirical and sociological stance, within its historical context” -  in 
contrast to what they call in their abstract “earlier studies o f Canadian child custody 
determinations [that] have been written from ideological and feminist viewpoints.”25 
They thereby position themselves outside of ideology or bias, as neutral analysts. 
Millar and Goldenberg give the impression that once the more-or-less absolute 
preference for paternal custody o f legitimate children was eradicated in the 
nineteenth century, mothers then benefited almost totally from the so-called 
“maternal presumption” or the tender years doctrine. They argue that since mothers 
are still far more likely to receive custody than fathers (based on the statistics), 
gender bias in the system operates against fathers.
Historical research, including my own, has revealed a much more complex story 
than that portrayed by Millar and Goldenberg.26 There is no question that the tender 
years doctrine represented an important discursive shift in custody decision-making 
o f the mid-twentieth century. However, not only was this doctrine rejected legally 
by the Supreme Court o f Canada in the 1970s, but more importantly, the doctrine 
never represented a firm presumption in favour o f mothers. The presumption was 
highly contingent on “good behaviour” and on strict expectations o f mothers. It was 
all too easy for a father who chose to challenge a mother’s suitability as a  custodial 
parent and to rebut any presumption in favour o f maternal custody. Moreover, the 
presumption only operated in relation to young children and in circumstances where 
the mother could demonstrate that she conformed to the high expectations o f proper 
motherhood. Mothers who were adulterous, lesbian, employed, or who appeared to 
abandon their husbands for no apparent good reason (in the minds o f the judges) 
were rarely able to meet these expectations. For example, in 1966, the British
24 P. Millar & S. Goldenberg “Explaining Child Custody Determinations in Canada” (1998) 13:2 Can. 
J. Law & Soc. 209. The National Post also devoted attention to this study: P. Waldie, “Study Finds Bias 
Against Men in Custody Cases” The National Post (2 Sept. 1999) A l, A2.
25 Millar & Goldenberg, ibid.
26 This research will be reported in my forthcoming book Child Custody Law: Women’s Work.
Columbia Court o f Appeal affirmed a trial judgement that granted custody to the 
father, mainly on the basis that the judge could not understand the mother’s 
“arbitrary” conduct in leaving her husband and depriving the children o f the 
advantage o f living with both parents in a family home. The mother was a 
physiotherapist with an “excellent salary.” The husband’s “acts o f violence towards 
the wife ©n three occasions within a short period” were classified as “o f a mild 
nature” and “on each occasion provoked by the wife.” The trial judge found that in 
the circumstances, “why should a husband and father be penalized by depriving him 
of the custody o f his infant children, which is one o f his most sacred rights.”27
Millar and Goldenberg explore various explanations for the fact that mothers 
have received custody orders more frequently than fathers even since the legal 
demise o f the tender years doctrine. They dismiss arguments that the custody 
awards reflect the fact that women are primary caregivers o f children, regardless o f 
whether they are employed or not, and regardless o f whether they are living in intact 
families or have separated or divorced from the other parent. They discount this idea 
by citing the incidence o f women in the labour force, including working single 
mothers, and suggesting that women are spending less time in the home. Overall, 
they argue that the underlying gap in gender roles in childcare and domestic labour 
is decreasing over time.
Having determined that social science studies provide no reason for the gender 
bias they detect in child custody awards, Millar and Goldenberg turn to the legal 
system for an explanation. They find that the rise in number of female judges during 
the 1980s was too small to explain the continuation and (they argue) rise in maternal 
custody awards during the 1980s. However, they detect another possible cause: the 
fact that the first seminars on gender issues for the judiciary began in the mid-1980s, 
focusing on “how the legal system is unfair to women.” The authors conclude that 
the possibility that judicial education is “teaching sexism may be a concern” and say 
that “the adoption o f gender bias seminars for the judiciary may have contributed to 
a recent increase in sexism in child-custody determinations.”28 They recommend 
that judicial educators use material (perhaps they mean their own article) which 
“reflects the realities o f child-custody determinations in Canada and the current state 
o f social science evidence concerning gender roles and gendered abilities to parent
27 Re Moilliet ( 1965), 54 W.W.R. 111 at 115, afTd ( 1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 152.
28 Millar & Goldenberg, supra note 24 at 224.
children.”29 Fathers are, therefore, portrayed as victims of a legal system that has 
been biased against them, and is even more biased now that judicial educators have 
been mislead, presumably by feminists, into believing that the legal system is unfair 
to women. Feminists are implicitly portrayed as using poor research skills and as 
possessing a powerful propaganda machine that can have a direct impact on judicial 
education and on decision-making in courts.
What, then, can we expect from the current law reform process, given the 
presence of these powerful discourses that some might characterize as a “backlash” 
against women and progressive social change? The controversial and flawed report 
of the Special Joint Committee arguably reinforced these discourses. Moreover, it 
was not helpful in diminishing the problematic indeterminacy and potential for 
destructive litigation that exists in the current law.30 It also appears that the 
Government of Canada, while being somewhat cautious in emphasizing “one size 
does not fit all” and that there should be no presumptions in custody and access law, 
has embraced some of the problematic assumptions of the Committee’s Report.31 
The Minister of Justice stated, “I believe the Committee’s recommendation to adopt 
the new term ‘shared parenting’ has promise.”32 The more substantive Government 
response included the following statement:
The Government of Canada endorses the view of the Joint Committee that the 
family law system must discourage the estrangement of parents from their children.
A great deal of the literature in this area concludes that children’s well-being and 
development can be detrimentally affected by a long-term or permanent absence of 
a parent from their lives. Most children want and need contact with both their 
parents even after those parents divorce.33
19 Ibid.
30 For reviews o f the Report and the Committee’s process, see N. Bala, “A Report from Canada’s 
‘Gender War Zone’: Reforming the Child-Related Provisions of the Divorce Act" (1999) 16:2 Can. J. 
Fam. L. 163; B. Diamond, “The Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access: A Threat to Women’s 
Equality Rights” (1999) 19:1&2 Can. Woman Studies 182; M. Laing, “For the Sake of the Children: 
Preventing Reckless New Laws” (1999) 16:2 Can. J. Fam. L. 229.
31 Canada, Department of Justice, Government o f Canada s Response to the Report ofthe Special Joint 
Committee on Child Custody and Access, “Strategy for Reform, May 1999,” online: 
<http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/Publications/Reports/sjcarp02> (last modified: 10 May 1999).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
The contradictory nature of the research on this point, showing that the benefits of 
contact are in fact contingent on various factors, was once again overlooked.34
The fact that extremist positions from the fathers’ rights lobby succeeded in 
influencing public discourse, in the media, in the Senate, and ultimately in the 
Special Joint Committee does not necessarily mean that the most extreme ideas from 
that lobby will appear in new laws and approaches to custody and access. However, 
it does mean that any “compromise” position resulting from the law reform process 
will likely veer more closely to the fathers’ rights position than it might otherwise 
have done. It also means that the Government of Canada has eschewed any 
meaningful gender analysis in its Response. As well, discussion of “family 
violence” has been subsumed under the neutralizing headings “high conflict” (in the 
Committee’s Report) or “managing conflict” (in the Government of Canada 
Response). It may then be more difficult for any new legislation to introduce an 
emphasis on the relevance of systemic male abuse of women and children to child 
custody decision-making, an emphasis that was recommended by women’s groups. 
Without this emphasis, a move towards shared parenting (which at this point the 
Government appears to endorse) may increase the difficulties -  and indeed the 
danger -  that women and often children face when leaving abusive relationships.
The experience from other jurisdictions is instructive. In England, Carol Smart 
and Bren Neale found that under the Children Act 1989 (c.41 ), a strong presumption 
in favour of contact between children and non-residential parents has emerged 
regardless of any prevailing circumstances, such as abuse. They found that contact 
had taken on an increasingly rigid and dogmatic form.35 Even when abuse has been 
emphasized in legislation, as in Australia and Washington State, it has tended to take 
a back seat to the push toward contact or shared parenting in other provisions of the 
statute.36 In Washington State, survivors of domestic violence often have parenting 
plans that they believe compromise their own and their children’s safety.37 In 
Australia, it appears to have become more difficult to obtain an interim order
34 See Bailey & Giroux, supra note 7; Lye, supra note 4.
35 C. Smart & B. Neale, “Arguments Against Virtue -  Must Contact be Enforced?” (1997) 27 Fam. L. 
332.
36 Ellis, supra note 4 at 72,75 etseq.. Ellis has also shown that when primary care-giving is mentioned 
in a statute, it remains easy for courts to fail to give it adequate weight: J.W. Ellis, “The Washington 
State Parenting Act in the Courts: Reconciling Discretion and Justice in Parenting Plan Disputes” ( 1994)
69 Washington L. R. 679.
37 Lye, supra note 4.
suspending contact due to domestic violence.38 Canadian governments should also 
take note that the Australian reforms intended to enhance shared responsibilities by 
parents and to give non-custodial parents (mainly fathers) a greater sense of 
involvement in relation to their children have resulted in increased litigation, 
particularly as a result of fathers initiating contact-related litigation.39
The Government of Canada, and provincial governments in Canada, are likely 
to find that presumptions in favour of primary caregiver or custodial parents in 
relation to decision-making for example, are too politically controversial to embrace. 
The fathers’ rights groups have fairly successfully generated an impression in the 
general public that the systen* inappropriately limits paternal participation in 
children’s lives; any legal move regarded as reinforcing maternal custody is likely 
to be viewed as problematically gender biased as a result. However, if children’s 
interests truly are to be placed front and centre in custody and access law (or 
whatever we may end up calling it), some way of ensuring children greater certainty 
and continuity in terms of care-giving relations and in terms of what they can expect 
from the legal system is surely desirable. Carol Smart in her most recent work, 
based on a study of the impact of the law reforms to custody and access in the 
English Children Act 1989, has suggested that a feminist ethic of care be deployed.40 
This approach would include the following principles: ( 1 ) that decisions or outcomes 
be derived from the realities of the lives of the people involved, including who the 
primary carer has been, whether both parents have a relationship with the child, and 
whether there is a climate of coercion and fear; and, (2) that the child be placed in 
a set of relationships and the quality of those relationships -  including a history of 
caring for children -  be taken into account. “The principle of care would import the 
concept of connectedness and would place less emphasis on rights. Thus, it would 
lean toward maintaining contact with all family members where possible, but not at 
the cost of coercion.”41
38 Rhoades, Graycar & Harrison, supra note 4 at 59-60.
39 Ibid. See also M. Harrison & A. Nicholson, “Better Laws for Promoting the Best Interests of 
Children? A Commentary on the Australian Family Law Reform Act 1995” (2000) Special Lectures of 
the Law Society of Upper Canada 16:1.
40 Family Fragments, supra note 4 at 192-7. This approach draws on the work of Dutch feminist scholar 
S. Sevenhuijsen, Citizenship and the Ethics o f  Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and 
Politics (London: Routledge, 1998).
41 Family Fragments, supra note 4 at 193.
As long as familial relations remain gendered, family laws and changes to them 
are likely to produce differential impacts on women and men. In the end, we may do 
better to confront these differences directly than to avoid the implications of gender- 
based difference in current parenting relations and in law reform processes. There 
is not yet a level-playing field in parenting or in child custody law, and until 
women’s inequality has been eradicated in social relations of the family, it would be 
extremely dangerous to assume that there is such a level field. More dangerous still 
is the fact that while the arguments of fathers’ rights groups have achieved some 
influence on public policy, feminist arguments and the arguments of women’s 
groups have not had a high standing in family law reform. As Carol Smart has said, 
“[fjeminism is associated with a single-minded pursuit of women’s interests which, 
it is presumed, inevitably leads to the trammelling of children’s interests and -  of 
course -  the interests of men.”42 If decision-makers and policy-makers could put 
aside these assumptions and this caricature of feminism, the direction of child 
custody law reform might prove more encouraging, and the interests of children 
might properly be placed at the centre of the debates.
42 Ibid. at 186.
